Israel braces itself for Syrian fallout

Unpredictable Middle East geopolitical imbalances with many new threats and opportunities for Israel will be the focus of history books about 2024.

After the traumatic invasion from Gaza by Hamas in October 2023, Israel engaged in a 10-front war. The tactics and strategy for the defence of Israel included pre-emptive and preventive offensive land, sea, and air operations throughout the region.

By the end of 2024, Israel had succeeded in reducing the threat of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon by targeted assassinations of their leadership, and by engaging in fierce hand-to-hand combat. The iconic terrorists who ubiquitously dominated television screens and social media – Hassan Nasrallah; Yahya Sinwar; and Ismail Haniyeh – will no longer rant about Israel’s imminent destruction.

After Iran launched a massive ballistic missile and drone attack on Israel in October 2024, Israel responded by destroying most of Iran’s air defence systems. Israel has also destroyed targets in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, from whence missiles and drones were launched against Israeli cities.

Israel knew that there would be consequences for weakening Iran and its linchpin proxies – Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi and Shia Islamic groups in Iraq. Scenarios were constructed especially focusing on the Sunni Islamic groups that Iran and its proxies have been fighting for the past two decades – Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, as well as Kurdish resistance groups.

The challenge for Israeli intelligence organisations, including the Mossad, was the difficulty and difference between forecasting and prediction. Exactly when and how the consequences would unfold and the ramifications for Israel would emerge only when these latent and freshly empowered groups acted.

The first signs of such action commenced on 27 November 2024, when rebel forces in Syria started a limited offensive against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Iran and Hezbollah, weakened by Israel, were unable and unwilling to provide the same support to Syria that they had since the onset of the Arab Spring in 2010. Similarly, a busy and weakened stalwart ally, Russia, at war in Ukraine, was nowhere to be seen. Turkey gave overt consent and support to the rebel forces.

On 8 December, the fall of Damascus marked the end of the Assad family regime, which had ruled Syria as a totalitarian hereditary dictatorship since Hafez al-Assad assumed the presidency in 1971 as a result of the Corrective Revolution. It has left a local power vacuum and a regional tinderbox indicative of broader realignments ongoing since the first Gulf War in 1990.

There were mixed feelings in Israel. On the one hand, there was joy and relief that at long last, the Iranian backed Assad regime that posed a constant danger was gone. That doesn’t mean the rebels are an ally of Israel. To be sure, the potential for chaos on the Israel-Syria border and Sunni extremist terror is heightened. Israel followed a two-step process, military and political.

Israel’s air force destroyed weapons arsenals throughout Syria to ensure that the rebel forces wouldn’t seize them. Israeli land forces crossed the border into the buffer zone between the Golan Heights and the rest of Syria, The Purple Line, as both defence and deterrence. The operation marked the first time in 50 years that Israeli forces have crossed the Syrian border fence, following ceasefire agreements on 31 May 1974 in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War.

The political process included reaching out to the rebel forces through Druze communities in southern Syria, and Kurdish forces in northern Syria. The goal was to dissuade the euphoric rebels, lest they storm onward to Israel, as Hamas had done. While the processes worked, the longer term is challenging. It will depend on who controls Syria politically and economically. It’s not clear who this will be.

It will be extremely ambitious for the Syrian rebel groups to agree on a new governing system in Syria. This in part is due to the diversity of the rebel coalition. Some groups are more structured, more organised, others are more local entities. Assad’s fall could turn Syria into a battleground dominated by jihadist forces, a collection of extremist organisations uninterested in dialogue or agreements. With winter approaching, the dire economic conditions are evident, and this could lead to intense unrest or civil war. About 90% of the population live below the poverty line, and many are in displacement camps.

Clearly then, the collapse of Assad’s brutal regime places Israel in a complex situation, presenting new threats and significant opportunities. It will help with the battle in Lebanon. Syria is no longer a central link in the Shiite axis connecting Tehran to Beirut, serving as a corridor for transferring Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. The result is a greater isolation of Hezbollah.

The collapse of Assad’s regime undermines Iran’s influence in the Middle East and harms its plans to surround Israel. However, it also creates a difficult fine line for Israel with Assad’s other main ally, Russia. Russia won’t want to lose its strategic bases in Syria, the airbase in Khmeimim, and the naval base in Latakia. That would weaken its regional standing. The clear danger is that Russia might step up its presence to mitigate the reduced Iranian involvement.

By itself, Russian presence in Syria wouldn’t pose a threat to Israel. However, the chaos likely to emerge in Syria could tempt Turkey to intervene more aggressively. Its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, views Syria, particularly its Kurdish minority in the north, as a threat to his borders. The dangerous scenario for Israel is that Syria and adjacent Lebanon could become a fierce battle ground for domination between Turkey and Russia.

On an optimistic note, a new Syria could lead to the unification of the Druze communities in Israel and Syria, a promise that Israel has often expressed since 1967. It could also lead to a peace treaty if a stable regime emerges in Damascus with a permanent arrangement for Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

The bottom line is that Israel has no direct control over events in Syria. It cannot dictate broader or finer dynamics, and remains primarily an observer. Sitting on the sidelines, observing, and preparing for all potential scenarios and outcomes has been the preferred foreign and defence policy for Israel since 1948. This is no exception.

Israel joins the rest of the world and the Syrian population in wondering what’s next. Events are still unfolding rapidly in Syria and the region. Trepidation isn’t only felt in Israel, but by all those who have sought and relied upon Russia and Iran for support.

• Glen Segell is a professor at the University of Cambridge.